I develop model of policy making in complex domains where bureaucrats find it very di cult to establish autonomous sources of expertise so that regulators are highly dependent on the regulated industry. Such policy environments create tradeo↵s between expertise and autonomy. In the model, a legislative principal decides whether to delegate power to an agency to regulate the activities of a firm or industry. The policy domain is complex in that knowledge of the implications of di↵erent policy choices is concentrated in the firm. Unless the agency commits significant resources to building its own expertise, it can learn about the policy environment only through monitoring the firm's e↵orts at self-regulation. Such learning is imperfect, and the information obtained from monitoring declines as the complexity of the policy environment increases. The main result is that as policy becomes more complex, regulatory outcomes are increasingly biased towards those preferred by the firm. Moreover, when the agency has preferences that diverge from the firm, the firm invests less in its own self-regulatory e↵orts for fear that its policy investments will be expropriated.
In the debates on financial market reform that followed the Financial Crisis of 2008, reformers advocated three distinct approaches. Some argued that governments should fundamentally restructure the financial sector. Large banks should be broken up. Investment and commercial banks should be separated as they had been under the Glass Steagall reforms of the 1930s (or at least the investment activity of commercial banks should be drastically restricted). These reformers promoted limits on the types of financial products that could be marketed and new taxes on financial transactions. Opponents of government intervention argued the opposite position. They argued that a government-led reconstruction of the financial marketplace would be counter-productive if not futile. Such actions would impede financial innovation and restrict credit and market liquidity. At most, according to the opponents, reform should get the taxpayer o↵ the hook for the failure of financial firms. The middle ground in this debate was held by those who argued that the basic structure of the financial sector should remain intact but that the capacity and powers of regulatory agencies should be enhanced to better monitor the sector for systemic risks, financial fraud, and predatory lending practices. The middle ground, reflected in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (i.e. "Dodd-Frank"), generally won out.
Although the debate about financial reform centered on economic trade-o↵s, the central questions are essentially ones of politics and public administration. Can the government e↵ectively regulate a large, complex, and interconnected financial sector? If the answer is yes, then the middle ground of enhanced regulatory supervision seems promising. If the answer is no, then either of the more extreme approaches may be more compelling.
Unfortunately, there are many reasons to believe the answer to this question is no.
Financial markets and products may be so complex that agencies lack the capacity to detect systemic risk and fraud. Moreover, regulators may be so dependent on the industry for expertise and talent that they are not able to exercise independent regulatory authority.
At best under such conditions, regulation will accommodate the preferences of the financial industry. At worst, regulators may be captured by industry.
Although bureaucratic capacity in complex policy environments is very salient to de-bates about financial reform, this issue manifests itself in a large number of policy domains ranging from rate and service regulation to product and workplace safety to the environment. Despite the centrality of such concerns, political scientists have been slow to develop theories and models of how complexity, capacity, and capture might interact in the regulatory sphere and what policy making trade-o↵s these interactions induce.
To be sure, political scientists have focused on the role of information and expertise in regulatory settings. Much of political science scholarship on regulation focuses on the decision of elected politicians to delegate policy making authority to the better informed experts employed in the bureaucracy. Because legislators are policy generalists rather than experts, they may find it di cult to select good policies in uncertain environments.
Consequently, they grant bureaucratic specialists discretion in policy choice (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004) .
While it has provided many useful insights, the informational approach to delegation has three significant limitations. First, the informational delegation literature often does not problematize the source of bureaucratic expertise and information. Bureaucratic expertise is often taken as exogenous or as the result of human capital investments by bureaucrats (Gailmard and Patty 2004; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004) . Likewise, bureaucrats are assumed to have the relevant information or can obtain it at some cost or e↵ort. In this regard, the approach in political science is quite di↵erent from that of regulatory economists for whom the regulator's extraction of information from the regulated firm is the central problem (Baron and Myerson 1982; La↵ont and Tirole 1986) .
Second, much of the work on delegation assumes that bureaucrats can e ciently and e↵ectively implement their policy choices. But as Huber and McCarty (2004) point out, imperfect implementation generates ex post control problems for political principals (see Bendor and Meirowitz 2004) . When there are errors in policy implementation, political principals find it more di cult to detect when agents attempt to implement policies that the principals disapprove of. This problem enhances the possibility of bureaucratic drift.
Third, this literature often draws no distinction between information and knowledge.
Expertise is modeled as the acquisition of missing data to be applied to a known model to generate some desired policy outcome. But expertise also reflects that experts have better knowledge of the true underlying model than do non-experts. As I explain below, treating expertise solely as missing data can make inferences by non-experts too easy which may in turn undermine the value of expertise. But when inference problems are more di cult to solve, non-expert agents may be forced to defer more often to the experts.
In an attempt to fill some gaps in our understanding of regulatory policy making, I develop a model of policy making in complex policy domains. By complex, I mean that bureaucrats find it very di cult to establish autonomous sources of knowledge and expertise about the consequences of di↵erent policies. The recurring example of financial regulation fits this setting well. In a less complex regulatory environment, the government might mitigate any expertise advantages of the regulated industry by hiring its own experts to serve on the sta↵s of legislative and regulatory agencies. In finance and other complex environments, the wage premium on expertise might be large enough that the government cannot match the expertise of the industry.
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Together these features of complex policy environments invariably create trade-o↵s between expertise and capacity on one hand and autonomy on the other. These trade-o↵s are central to my model. In the model, a legislative principal decides whether to delegate power to an agency to regulate a firm or industry. The policy domain is complex in that much of the knowledge of the implications of di↵erent policy choices is embedded in the firm. Unless the agency is willing and able to commit significant resources to building its own expertise, it can learn about the policy environment only through monitoring the firm's activities. This learning, however, is imperfect and the information obtained from monitoring declines in the complexity of the policy environment.
1 Philippon and Reshef (2009) have estimated that on the eve of the Financial Crisis, wages in the financial sector were 70% higher than those of comparably skilled and educated workers outside the sector. Governmental pay scales cannot compete with Wall Street for talent.
My model of policy learning builds upon the observation that public regulation generally supplements and builds upon the e↵orts of firms and industries to self-regulate. Many industries have trade associations and private regulators who develop, implement, and enforce rules and standards on the industry. One might also think of the modern firm as a private regulator. Managers regulate workers, parent companies regulate divisions, and so on. Moreover, many firms make substantial investments in the creation of self-regulatory institutions such as auditors, human resource managers, and risk managers. A central premise of my model is that public regulatory agencies can both learn from observing these private regulatory e↵orts and possibly free ride o↵ the expertise that went into designing those e↵orts.
To illustrate the logic of my model, consider an example from financial regulation. On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 900 points (or about 9%) in a matter of minutes. The belief that this "flash crash" was caused or exacerbated by high frequency trading led both regulators and the industry to consider new regulations including "circuit breakers" that would stop the trading of securities whose price has fluctuated too much.
The exchanges and their private regulator the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) moved first to formulate rules for such circuit breakers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) therefore had the choice of accepting the FINRA standards, modifying them in various ways, or developing di↵erent ones from scratch. Accepting the FINRA standards leads to the regulatory outcome targeted by the industry. But modifying the proposal by adding a more aggressive set of circuit breakers would lead to outcomes that are closer in expectation to the SEC's preferences. Because of the SECs limited expertise and capacity, however, changes in the target outcome may have unintended consequences.
Requiring trading halts for smaller price changes may distort markets too much. So the SEC may be hesitant to change the FINRA proposal too much.
2 Anticipation of the SEC's behavior may in turn influence both the standards that FINRA chooses as well the e↵orts 2 In September 2010, the SEC adopted the rules developed by FINRA. See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-167.htm, downloaded July 10, 2011.
that go into developing them.
My main result is that as policy becomes more complex, regulatory outcomes are increasingly biased towards those preferred by the firm. Although the principal may try to minimize these biases by appointing a regulator whose preferences diverge from those of the firm, doing so reduces the firm's investments in self-regulation. In turn this may lead to greater uncertainty in policy outcomes and unintended consequences. When the principal is unable to su ciently reduce the pro-firm bias through agency appointments and structural reforms, she may prefer not to delegate power to the agency at all. If the agency is likely to be too deferential to the firm's expertise, the principal may prefer to economize on the fixed cost of regulation and allow the firm to remain unregulated. Alternatively, if the outcomes associated with an unregulated firm are too unfavorable, the principal may decide to ban the firm's activities or select some other bright-line rule that can be implemented by less expert bureaucrats.
The Model
There are three actors in the model: a legislative principal L, a regulatory agency A, and a firm F . In some cases, it might be productive to think of the firm as an entire industry, a trade association, or some other entity with private regulatory power.
I do not explicitly model the firm's production or the marketing of its output. I assume instead that actors have preferences over regulatory outcomes. Let X ⇢ R denote the set of outcomes. Outcome x is a measure of the social cost imposed by the firm's activities for a given level of social benefits. Because the firm internalizes social costs and benefits to a lesser degree than the legislator does, it is natural to assume that the legislator prefers lower outcomes on this dimension than the firm does. Let l, a, and f be the ideal regulatory outcomes for L, A, and F , respectively. Each player has quadratic preferences over outcomes so that the utility of x for player i is (x i) 2 . Further, I set l = 0, f > l, and a < f. Below I consider a variety of more specific assumptions about the preferences of the agency.
Following the literature on delegation, I model expertise as knowledge about how to obtain specific outcomes. Previous models assume that outcomes are generated by a linear combination of policy choices and random shocks (see Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Gailmard and Patty 2013) . Non-experts know the relationship between the shock and the outcome, but do not know the exact value of the shock. Alternatively, experts observe the value of the random shock and are therefore able to choose policy to get a desired outcome.
3 These assumptions imply that the acquisition of expertise is equivalent to learning the missing data. But it may be inappropriate to reduce expertise to information about missing data. While real-world regulators have ample opportunities to obtain data through regulatory reporting requirements and investigatory powers, the larger concern is whether the agency can use the data productively. In other words, expertise is more than information, it is the deeper knowledge of the model that links policies and outcomes.
Recently, Callander (2008) identified another limitation of the standard model. Because the standard model implies that the non-expert need only observe one policy and one outcome to become an expert, the principal generally has an ex post incentive to renege on its delegation of authority and move policy to its preferred outcome. Callander argues that it is more realistic to assume that the policy choices of experts only reveal local information;
that is, the principal should be able to make inferences about the e↵ects of policies close to the one chosen by the expert but learn little about the e↵ects of very di↵erent policies.
This critique is pertinent in those situations where policy information is di cult to obtain and the ability of non-experts to make good decisions based on inferences drawn from the behavior of experts is limited.
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The model is developed with these considerations in mind. First, following Callander, the inferences that other agents draw from observing the policy choices of experts are limited and local. A regulator cannot monitor the firm's actions that generated outcome x and use that information to perfectly implement policy outcome x 0 . Although the agency may observe the actions that implemented x, it does not know how to modify them to generate a distinct regulatory outcome with certainty.
Another key assumption is that agents cannot perfectly design and implement policies to get specific outcomes. Rather agents choose target policies that are implemented in an uncertain way. In simple policy arenas, the ultimate outcomes are often close to the policy targets. But when policies are complex, there may be large deviations between the target and the ultimate outcome. Moreover, I assume that expert agents are better at designing and implementing policies that hit their targets than are less expert agents. In the model, the firm is more expert than the agency.
Formally, if the agency tries to implement target policy x 0 after observing the firm implement target policy x, the realized outcome is x 0 + ! where ! has mean 0 and variance that depends on the proximity of x to x 0 as well as some underlying parameters related to the complexity of the policy arena. The variance of ! takes the form
where d(x, x 0 ) = |x x 0 |. The parameter ✓ reflects one aspect of policy complexity: the baseline uncertainty associated with the implementation of a target policy. This uncertainty is then amplified when the agency revises it. The function c(d) reflects a second aspect of complexity, the extent to which uncertainty increases when the policy target is revised from x to x 0 .
This functional form captures the assumption that the agency can make large revisions 4 In the standard model, the agency may not be able to make correct inferences because the firm distorts its behavior. Finally, I assume that the firm can reduce the variability of policy outcomes by investing in self-regulation. These investments take the form of a self-regulatory e↵ort e 0. These e↵orts might include research or planning designed to improve the implementation of the firm's own policy. They might also include better monitoring of units in an M-form organization. These investments may also reflect decisions of the firm to increase transparency in ways that might improve implementation through better coordination with other firms or customers. Such e↵orts at transparency may not only entail direct costs, but may also result in forgone economic opportunities through revealed trade secrets and the like. As an example, consider the regulation of high-frequency securities trading. More e↵ective self-5 My framework is closely related to several other models where agenda setters make "take-it-or-change-it" o↵ers. These models have been applied to opinion writing on the Supreme Court (Lax and Cameron 2007) , presidential bargaining with Congress (Howell and Jackman 2011), executive oversight of rulemaking (Wiseman 2009) , and delegation to legislative committees (Hirsch and Shotts 2011) .
regulation by the securities industry and the exchanges might require traders to reveal more information about their trading platforms and strategies. But revealing this information is costly as it eliminates the advantages that firms obtain from proprietary strategies.
For simplicity, the firm's cost of informational e↵ort is simple and linear: k(e) = f e. Importantly, the firm's regulatory e↵orts not only reduce the variance associated with its own policy choice, but also the variance associated with any modifications demanded by the agency. For example, should trade associations demand increased transparency for its regulatory e↵orts, regulators can use that transparency to more e↵ectively modify selfregulations.
The key assumptions of the model are captured in Figure 1 . The firm moves first and attempts to implement x at some e↵ort e. The distribution of outcomes following this decision is given by the thick solid curve centered at x. Next the agency decides on a revised policy target x. If the agency chooses a policy target relatively close to x such as x 0 , the outcome variance will be lower than if it chose the more distant policy target x 00 .
The distributions are shown by the solid lines centered at x 0 and x 00 . If the firm exerts a lower level of e↵ort, however, the outcome variances at these two policies will be larger.
These distributions are shown by the dotted curves. Similarly, the e↵ects of  can be demonstrated. Suppose there are two values  1 >  2 . When  =  1 , modifying the policy to x 0 or x 00 produces the distributions with dotted curves while modification when  =  2 produces the solid curves.
Figure 2 outlines the sequence of play. In the basic model, the ideal point of the agency a is exogenous and known to the principal. I subsequently relax this assumption and allow the principal to directly choose the agency's preferences.
6
The principal moves first and chooses the regulatory regime from among banned, regulated, and unregulated. In the unregulated regime, the firm self-regulates by implementing 6 The exogenous agency preference model may reflect the e↵ects of the separation of powers where the legislature makes the decision of whether to create the agency but the executive retains the authority for sta ng the agency (McCarty 2004).
X"
Frequency of Outcomes

x' x
Figure 1: Policy Outcome Distributions a regulatory outcome, and the game ends. Because the firm's decision cannot be amended by an agency, it chooses its ideal outcome as the policy target. Therefore, x u = f . The firm may also invest e↵ort in reducing the variance of the outcome. It chooses e to maximize:
Intuitively, the firm's regulatory e↵ort is high when policy uncertainty is high and is low when the marginal cost of e↵ort is high.
7
The equilibrium level of uncertainty is min{✓,
} which is increasing in both f and ✓. Second, the principal may ban the firm's activity. If she does so, the regulatory outcome is given exogenously by x b < 0. The ban, therefore, is assumed to be ine cient in that it produces a lower social benefit-cost ratio than the principal's ideal (0), but it does so with certainty.
8 The principal prefers the ban to the unregulated case if and only if x
Consequently, for a given value of x b , the principal is more likely to prefer a ban to non-regulation for larger values of ✓ and f . The result for ✓ is straightforward and 7 The outcome in this case may not reflect the firm's profit maximization. It may instead reflect the firm's optimal choice under the pressures and constraints of private politics (Baron 2013) .
8 The ban could easily be modeled as an uncertain outcome. In that case, x b would reflect the certainty-equivalent of the lottery induced by the ban. One might also interpret x b as some bright-line rule other than a ban.
obvious. The e↵ect of f reflects the concern that the firm will not invest enough e↵ort in its own regulatory e↵orts to produce better outcomes than those obtained under the ban.
Importantly, I do not allow the firm to precommit to e↵ort levels su cient to assuage the principal's concerns. But regulation also a↵ects the firm's investment in self-regulation. In the model, a firm's investment can be partially expropriated by the agency. So the firm may invest less in information for self-regulation when faced with a hostile regulator.
In the regulatory regime, A observes F 's policy choice x f and investment decision e and then makes its investment decision and policy choice. Consider the final stage where A chooses its best response to {x f , e}. It chooses x a to maximize
The agency faces a trade-o↵ between increasing the utility of the target outcome and increasing the implementation variance. It can choose a target outcome x a that is close to its ideal point a in order to maximize its utility from the expected outcome (the first term). But if doing so involves a policy target far from x f , the uncertainty about the policy outcomes increases (the second term). Lemma 1 characterizes the agency's best response. Lemma 1. The agency's best response to {x f , e} is given by
Lemma 1 demonstrates that when the firm chooses a target policy su ciently close to the agency's ideal point, the agency accepts it and does not regulate further. The critical distance between the firm target and agency ideal point that triggers an agency response is
which is increasing in the policy complexity (in terms of both ✓ and ) and decreasing in the firm's investment. Consequently, the firm can avoid agency meddling either by choosing a target close to that preferred by the agency or by investing in less information for its self-regulation.
Alternatively, if the agency modifies the policy target, it chooses a target that is a weighted average of its ideal target and that of the firm. The weight on the agency's ideal point is 1+e 1+e+✓
, an increasing function of the firm's regulatory investment. The weight on the firm's ideal point is ✓ 1+e+✓ which is proportional to the baseline complexity of the policy.
Given the agency's best response to the target outcome of the firm x f and its information investment e, the firm chooses its policy target optimally. The firm's choice reduces to two options. First, it could set a relatively extreme target that the agency might modify. I call this situation the revision case. Alternatively, the firm might choose a policy that su ciently accommodates the agency such that no regulatory revision is necessary. I call this scenario the accommodation case.
I begin with the revision case. Because f > a by assumption, the only relevant sub-case is where x f is greater than a and is su ciently large to induce the agency to revise the target. From Lemma 1, the revision case requires x f > a + ✓
1+e
. Therefore, the firm's expected utility is given by
The unique maximizer of Equation 2 is x
10 This result is counter-intuitive.
Rather than make fewer concessions when revising the policy target is di cult, the firm deviates more from its ideal point when the marginal cost of amending its policy target is large. It is increasingly accommodating because it is more di cult for the agency to expropriate its regulatory investment. Thus, by accommodating su ciently, the agency's revision and consequent increase in uncertainty is small. While one might also expect that the firm's accommodation would be related to the baseline level of uncertainty ✓
, it turns out not to be. There are two e↵ects of larger values of ✓ 1+e that cancel out. Higher values lead the agency to make fewer adjustments, but any adjustments are more costly to the firm.
Given the firm's choice, it is easy to see that
. This expression also has a straightforward interpretation. The final policy outcome is the weighted average of the ideal points of the agency and the firm where the weight on that of the agency is 1+e 1+e+✓
. So the firm's regulatory e↵orts move the equilibrium policy target towards the agency's ideal point. This e↵ect is the expropriation problem.
11 Therefore, whenever the firm makes greater regulatory investments, it trades the reduction in uncertainty against the possibility that the agency will expropriate some of that investment in order to regulate the firm more strictly.
In the accommodation case, the firm chooses its preferred target policy from those that will not be revised by the agency. Given the agency's response function, such a target solves
. The firm chooses an accommodating target when a > f  1+e+✓ 1+e
.
10 Because I am considering the revision case,  is assumed to be su ciently small that
11 See also Aghion and Tirole (1997) where the principal may precommit to not reversing an agent's decision to assure the agent that her investments in information will not be expropriated.
Logically, the firm is willing to accommodate the agency when its ideal point is close to the firm's and when policies are di cult to amend (high , high ✓, and low e).
A special sub-case is where the firm targets its ideal point and the agency accepts. This scenario occurs when a f ✓ 1+e
. If the firm's ideal point is not revised, its investment decision is the same as that of the unregulated case. Therefore, I can define a critical value of the agency ideal pointā = f ✓ 1+e u . Any agency with ideal point a >ā generates an outcome equivalent to that of the unregulated regime.
Finally, I turn to the firm's information investment decision where it chooses e to maximize its expected payo↵, given the best response policy target of the agency. First, consider an interior solution where the firm chooses an e↵ort level that is greater than 0 and leads to the agency choosing a revised policy target. In this case, the firm's utility function is
This expression can be rewritten as
Equation 4 reveals that the firm's utility has three components. The first is related to the preference di↵erence between the firm and the agency, (f a) 2 . Increasing selfregulatory e↵ort increases the coe cient on the term 1+e 1+e+✓
and thus lowers the firm's utility proportional to the preference di↵erence between the firm and agency. This negative incentive to invest in self-regulation is directly attributable to the possibility that an agency with preferences di↵erent from those of the firm would expropriate some of the informational investment and move the policy target away from the firm's ideal point. The second term reflects the costs of uncertainty reflected in ✓. Here increasing e↵ort reduces uncertainty and thus increases utility. This second term is multiplied by 1  2 which may either be interpreted as a measure of the agency's expertise or as the simplicity of the policy domain.
Either way, it corresponds to the ease with which the agency can expropriate investments in self-regulation. The combined term therefore reflects the increased uncertainty associated with expropriation. The final component is simply the cost of the firm's self-regulatory e↵orts.
Second, consider the case where the firm chooses a level of e↵ort that leads the agency to accept its policy target. The firm's utility in this case is f a The weak inequalities in Proposition 1 are generated either by the de facto unregulated case of a ā or the corner solution e ⇤ = 0. From above we know that x ⇤ a is an increasing function of a and e ⇤ . This fact combined with Proposition 1 part 1 proves that the total e↵ect (direct and indirect) of a on x ⇤ a is positive. Higher values of a also decrease the variance of the final outcome. Consider the revision outcome which occurs for su ciently low a. In this case, the outcome variance is
which decreases in e and therefore in a. In the accommodation case, the outcome variance is ✓
. Again since the equilibrium outcome variance is decreasing in e, it is also decreasing in a. These results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The final target policy is a weakly increasing function of a while the outcome variance is a decreasing function of a.
The Principal's Problem
Now consider the preferences of the principal over the ideal point of the agency. Proposition 2 summarizes the principal's trade-o↵s. By creating an agency with preferences closer to her own, the principal obtains better policy outcomes in expectation but incurs the cost of more uncertainty. This trade-o↵ suggests that the principal may prefer an agency with pro-firm preferences in order to reduce the uncertainty of the final outcome. Proposition 3 provides a su cient condition for the principal to prefer an agency with preferences more pro-firm than her own.
, the principal's optimal agency ideal point a ⇤ is strictly greater than 0 and weakly lower thanā.
Proposition 3's su cient condition insures that an agency with ideal point a = 0 revises the firm's target in equilibrium. This condition insures that the marginal e↵ect of increasing a on the outcome variance is larger than the expected policy loss associated with a more pro-firm policy target. The condition is not a necessary one, however. It is easy to construct examples where it does not hold, yet the principal still prefers to appoint a relatively profirm agent.
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The result of Proposition 3 highlights the principal's fundamental trade-o↵. It can obtain an expected policy outcome closer to its ideal point by choosing a close to zero. But doing so is costly. First, it lowers the firm's investment in self-regulation which in turn leads to greater uncertainty. Second, it leads to a larger amount of agency revision of the policy which also increases uncertainty.
The second part of Proposition 3 demonstrates that the principal always chooses an agency with preferences weakly lower thanā. So absent any fixed costs of regulation, the principal will always weakly prefer regulation to non-regulation. The principal's utility at a ⇤ may be su ciently low that she prefers a bright-line rule x b to regulation. The principal is more likely to prefer the bright-line rule when the complexity parameters ✓ and  are larger. A larger ✓ unambiguously reduces the principal's utility from regulation as it leads to a more accommodating policy target and more uncertainty. Similarly, an increase in  weakly increases the equilibrium policy target and equilibrium uncertainty.
13 So the model suggests that policy complexity should lead to greater reliance on bright-line rules or bans.
Higher levels of f also reduce principal welfare through the reduction in e. So bright-line rules or bans are more likely when self-regulation is costly.
In Proposition 3, the principal is willing to delegate to a more pro-firm agency to minimize the expropriation problem even if the pro-firm agency is not more expert. But in many cases, there may be a strong correlation between agency preferences and expertise.
This occurs when the necessary expertise and training is available only through the industry or in professional schools and training programs were the curriculum is favorable to industry interests.
14 The trade-o↵s created by a link between agency preferences and expertise can 13 The e↵ects of  are more subtle than those of ✓. In the revision case, the main e↵ect of an increase in  is the reduction in firm e↵ort which in turn increases the equilibrium policy target. The equilibrium level of uncertainty is given by 1 a 1+e+✓
. Thus the reduction in e induced by a higher  unambiguously increases the level of uncertainty, even though the larger  does reduce the equilibrium policy revision. In the accommodation case, the first-order e↵ect of an increase in  is an increase in the equilibrium target policy. While it is possible for an increase in  to increase e, this e↵ect is more than o↵set by the e↵ect of  on the policy target.
14 For example, in finance, there are few opportunities to acquire the necessary expertise about financial markets outside of the industry or from business schools. Consequently, financial regulators often share strong social ties to the industry and are more sympathetic on average to the industry's interests and viewpoints. In debates about financial regulation, this phenomenon has been dubbed cognitive capture. See Johnson and Kwak (2010) .
be analyzed within my framework. Let , interpreted as agency's capacity, be a function of a. Assume that (a) is a decreasing function so that an agency with preferences close to those of the firm can modify its policies more e↵ectively and focus on the target revision case. The main e↵ect of this change is an enhanced e↵ect of appointing a pro-firm agency on the firm's e↵ort level. As before, there is a positive direct e↵ect of a more pro-firm agency on the firm's information gathering. But now there is an additional indirect e↵ect because the more pro-firm agency has a lower value of . The lower  induces more revision so that the outcome variance increases, which in turn induces more e↵ort from the firm.
So the principal's benefits from a pro-firm agency are increased due to greater levels of firm investment in information and self-regulation. This investment reduces policy uncertainty and mitigates the distributive loss of a more pro-firm agency. But these gains are o↵set because decreasing  increases the equilibrium level of policy revision which increases uncertainty.
Capture
This section adds a very simple model of regulatory capture to the framework. In this extension, the firm first chooses its self-regulatory investment and then o↵ers the agency a contract {x c , b} where x c is a policy target and b is a transfer of resources. Although such transfers may not be entirely illicit, I call them "bribes." If the agency accepts the contract, it accepts target x c and receives the bribe. If it rejects the contract, it chooses x a optimally given x c . Absent the e↵ects of uncertainty and complexity, the equilibrium outcome is f +a 2 , the midpoint of the firm's and agency's ideal points. Although in the equilibrium of this model the agency does not revise the firm's o↵er, complexity a↵ects the agency's reservation utility based on its optimal no-bribe response to x c . Because complexity and uncertainty reduce the agency's utility from revising the target policy x c , the firm can reduce its equilibrium bribe. This allows the firm to obtain a policy target higher than f +a 2 without increasing its bribe.
The following proposition describes the equilibrium to the complexity game when the firm can use material resources to influence the agency.
Proposition 4. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the capture model, the following statements are true:
3. @xc @✓ > 0, @xc @ > 0, and @xc @e < 0 The equilibrium target policy is larger than the equilibrium in the standard bribery game. The magnitude of this "complexity premium" depends on a factor that is a function of the uncertainty level ✓ and the firm's investment e. As increases, the target policy moves toward the firm's ideal point. Because is increasing in ✓ and decreasing in e, the target policy is increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. The policy target under capture is decreasing in the firm's investment just as in the original model. Although the firm's policy target is always accepted in the equilibrium of the capture game, the shadow of expropriation looms large. If the firm were to increase its investment, it would have to pay a larger bribe to reduce the agency's incentive to expropriate that information. But this does not mean that opportunities for capture do not make firm investments more secure from expropriation. The responsiveness of the policy target to the levels of investment is considerably lower when the agency is captured.
Thus, the firm is more secure in increasing its self-regulation.
This section highlights some empirical di culties in detecting capture. Because all of the comparative static predictions on the target policy are the same in the capture and no capture cases, correlations between policy targets and measures of policy complexity are unlikely to be very revealing. The prediction that capture increases the equilibrium policy target can in principle be tested only with good proxies for agency preferences.
Basing tests on the deviation of the policy target from the principal's ideal point is also complicated by the finding that the principal might actually prefer to delegate to a pro-firm agency. Perhaps the most useful insight, however, is the prediction that capture reduces the principal's incentives to delegate authority to a pro-firm agency.
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Regulatory Investments by the Agency
In the basic model, only the firm makes investments that reduce policy uncertainty. The model can be extended to allow the agency to make similar investments. To this end,
assume that e = e f + e a where e f is the firm's investment and e a is that of the agency. The term a designates the agency's marginal cost of investment. Substantively, a is an additional measure of agency capacity. If a is high relative to f , the agency is a "low capacity" regulator. Conversely, a high capacity agency has a low value of a . The firm and agency make their investment decisions simultaneously in the first stage of the game. Here I focus on the case where the agency revises the target policy. The expected utility of the agency in the first stage is given by (x a a)
f . An interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both agents make positive contributions must satisfy these two best-response conditions.
For all values of e, the bracketed terms in the two conditions are identical. From the perspective of uncertainty reduction, the investments are public goods that are valued by both agents equally. Therefore, the best response conditions di↵er only in terms of the distributive impact of investments and the marginal cost of providing them. With respect 15 See Carpenter (2004) for additional arguments about the the observational equivalence of accountable and captured bureaucracies.
to the distributive e↵ects, the agency benefits from higher levels of investment as it moves the optimal target policy closer to her ideal point. Consequently, since @xa @e < 0, the first term of the agency's best response condition is positive while the first term of the firm's is negative for all values of e. The final term of these expressions is simply the marginal cost of the investment which may vary across agents.
Note that best response conditions are functions only of e and not e a and e f individually. Moreover, except in knife-edge cases, one function is larger than the other for all values of e. Therefore, there are no pair of strictly positive investments e f and e a that satisfy the conditions. Consequently, in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, only one of the agents makes positive investments. Because the distributive impact of investment is positive for the agency, the agency will be the investor unless its marginal cost of investment is much higher than that of the firm. But when the firm has much lower marginal costs (a situation most closely aligned with my emphasis on complex policy environments), the firm will be the investor and the results of previous sections continue to hold.
For comparison purposes, consider the case where the agency is the investor (i.e.
f is large relative to a ). The main implication of this scenario is its e↵ect on the principal's preferences over the location of the agency. Namely, the principal no longer has an incentive to appoint a pro-firm agency. If the agency is the investor, the level of investment falls as the agency's ideal point moves towards that of the firm. So the principal no longer faces a trade-o↵ between expected policy and uncertainty. Moreover, the principal may now prefer a < 0 to stimulate even higher levels of investment and to move the equilibrium policy target as close to its ideal point of 0 as possible. The extended model suggests that in designing a regulatory regime, the principal faces a trade-o↵ between appointing a low capacity pro-firm agency or a high capacity agency with preferences that are at least as opposed to those of the firm as are the principal's.
Obfuscation by the Firm
So far the only regulatory activities of the firm have been their investments, which are expropriable by the regulatory agency. But in many situations, firms and industries may also invest in opacity and obfuscation so as to complicate outside regulatory e↵orts. Firms might make choices about products, organization, or accounting designed specifically to increase complexity in order to reduce regulatory burdens. In this section, I extend the model to incorporate such actions. Now the firm may invest in complexity designed to make regulatory revisions more costly. Formally, the firm may take costly actions that raise , the marginal uncertainty cost of regulatory revision.
Assume that absent obfuscation by the firm, the level of  is  0 . But at a marginal cost of ⇣, the firm may set a higher value. As established in previous results, the main e↵ect of raising  is to reduce the extent of regulatory revision and to make it more likely that the agency accommodates the firm's policy target. So the firm may have an incentive to raise
.
In this extension, it is never optimal for the firm to choose  ⇤ >  0 and have its policy target revised by the agency. The elimination of the agency's policy revision is the primary purpose of the obfuscation. So if the firm pays to increase , it does so su ciently to force the agency to accommodate its policy target. Thus, when firms obfuscate in equilibrium, the agency always accepts the firm's target. Proposition 5 establishes that in an equilibrium with positive amounts of obfuscation, the firm's target policy is
and this target is accepted by the agency. Consequently, the policy bias towards the firm is increasing in the baseline level of uncertainty, but also decreasing in the marginal costs of obfuscation and the firm's investment level.
Proposition 5. Consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model with obfuscation.
, then  ⇤ =  0 , and the outcome is identical to that where obfuscation is not possible.
which is not revised by the agency.
4. If  ⇤ >  0 , the firm's optimal investment e ⇤ is increasing in a.
The most important e↵ect of obfuscation is that the equilibrium policy target is considerably more biased toward the firm. This enhanced bias results from the firm's ability to increase  in order to forestall regulatory adjustments. A second important implication of obfuscation is that it may increase the principal's incentive to appoint a pro-firm agency.
When the firm obfuscates in equilibrium, appointing a more pro-firm agency has no e↵ect on the equilibrium policy target. But increasing a has two other e↵ects. First, the level of obfuscation decreases in a, but this only benefits the firm in equilibrium as the agency makes no policy revisions. Second, as in the basic model, the firm's regulatory e↵orts are an increasing function of a. Because the principal can induce greater self-regulation without increasing the policy target, she chooses to delegate to an agency with greater bias toward the firm than in the no obfuscation case. But of course obfuscation makes the principal much worse o↵ as it has a large e↵ect on policy bias. This decline in utility increases the likelihood that the principal might choose a ban or bright-line rule.
Multiple Firms
A reasonable conjecture is that the presence of more than one firm might facilitate better policymaking by the agent and produce better outcomes for the principal. Multiple firms might compete by o↵ering more favorable target policies or by making greater informational investments. While a full analysis of the model with multiple firms is beyond the scope of this paper, I briefly sketch a version of such a model. This sketch suggests that while the principal does benefit from multiple firms, the presence of more than one firm does not completely resolve the principal's or the agent's regulatory problems.
Consider a model with two firms with ideal points f 1 and f 2 . 16 The firms simultaneously choose target policies x f 1 and x f 2 as well as investments e 1 and e 2 . The agency then accepts or modifies one of the target policies and consequently implements it for both firms.
First assume a < f 1 < f 2 . The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this scenario is straightforward. The "moderate" firm 1 o↵ers the same target policy and investment that it would make if it were the only firm, and the "extreme" firm 2 makes no o↵er. Given firm 2's non-participation, firm 1's choices are clearly best responses. Establishing that the described strategies are an equilibrium, therefore, requires showing that firm 2 has no incentive to defect to an o↵er that the agency would prefer to the one o↵ered by firm 1.
Such an o↵er must involve either a target policy that results in lower policy choice by the agency or a larger information investment than the one made by firm 1. Clearly choosing a more moderate target policy reduces firm 2's utility. Since proposition 1 establishes that investments are declining in the firm's ideal point, it must be the case that the marginal utility for firm 2 of increasing the investment beyond e ⇤ 1 is negative, and firm 2 gains additionally from making a zero investment.
17 So firm 2 has no incentive to compete with firm 1's o↵er. In this case, the agency and principal are advantaged by multiple firms to the extent that the additional firm has more moderate preferences.
Next consider f 1 < a < f 2 . Now the firms have incentives to compete on target policies. Each may wish to move its target policy closer to a to avoid the adoption of the other firm's target. While this competition clearly benefits the agency and principal, it is straightforward to show that the target policies will not converge such that the final implemented target is a. Suppose this were the case so that x a (x f 1 , e 1 ) = x a (x f 2 , e 2 ) = a. My claim is that both firms have an incentive to deviate by o↵ering a higher investment in exchange for a target policy that induces an average outcome closer to its ideal point. The key is that given the agency's concave policy preferences, its utility is not very sensitive to 16 The other parameters of the model i.e.  and f are the same for both firms. 17 For the revision case, it is straightforward to show that the marginal utility of e 2 at e ⇤ 1 is e 2 (f 2 f 1 )(f 1 a) (1+e 2 +✓) 2 < 0. For the accommodation case, the marginal utility of e 2 at e ⇤ 1 is
small changes in the target near its ideal point. Thus it is willing to trade away expected policy for uncertainty reduction at very favorable terms. Conversely, in the postulated equilibrium, the firms incur large policy losses which they would be willing to avoid by enhancing their investments. These incentives undercut the convergent equilibrium. So having firms with ideal points on both sides of the agency ideal point tends to help the agency and the principal, but it does not eliminate the informational problems identified by the single firm version of the model.
Conclusions
This paper explores several issues about the role of expertise and complexity in regulatory policy. The most important implications of the model deal with the extent to which there is a policy bias toward the firm that is directly related to complexity. In such situations, regulatory agencies are deterred from more vigorous regulation due to the fear of unintended consequences. While self-regulation may mitigate policy uncertainty, the model illustrates how the threat of public regulation might dull the firm's incentives to self-regulate. Such a dilemma forces the legislative principal into a set of uncomfortable choices between delegating to pro-firm agencies or simple, but ine cient, bright-line rules or bans.
The model may be helpful in understanding the dynamics of regulatory policy in complex domains. As an example, consider the study of the political economy of U.S. financial crises by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2013) . These authors define a political bubble as a set of pro-cyclical policy biases that foster financial instability. The model provides microfoundations for such policy making biases. Assume that the actor's ideal points reflect di↵erent preferences over some policy instrument that influences the amount of risk-taking in the financial sector such as capital requirements or leverage rules. Let higher ideal points reflect preferences for greater risk.
Suppose some change in economic beliefs leads the firm to target rules that allow more risk so that f increases. The model makes several predictions about the ultimate outcome.
First, for a given agency ideal point, the equilibrium target policy increases. In the accommodating case, policy will be liberalized proportionately to ✓
1+e+✓
. Second, since the bubble increases the policy distance between the firm and the agency, the firm's level of self-regulation diminishes. Finally, in order to o↵set the firm's incentives to reduce selfregulation, the principal will move the agency's ideal point closer to the firm's new policy position.
Thus, the model rationalizes several patterns in financial regulation noted by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2013) . In response to an emerging bubble, policy moves in a deregulatory direction. Firms reduce heir internal regulatory e↵orts. More sympathetic regulators are appointed.
Importantly, these predictions are not predicted on many of the usual explanations for financial power. Capture of the regulatory agency by the firm is not necessary. While the extended model suggests that capture exacerbates these patterns, it is not required.
Nor is it necessary that the principal and agency share the firm's beliefs that "this time is
di↵erent." The model predicts a political bubble even when the preferences and beliefs of the principal and agency are unchanged.
Extensions to the basic model reveal areas of both optimism and concern. On the side of optimism, the extension that allows for agency investment demonstrates that if the agency has a strong capacity to reduce the baseline level of policy uncertainty regulatory outcomes improve and the rationale for delegation to pro-firm agencies disappears. But other realistic extensions of the model illustrate how the situation may be far worse for the principal. The capture extension illustrates how complexity makes it easier for the firm to use material incentives to influence the agency while firms have strong incentives to avoid regulation by increasing complexity.
Beyond the general observations about the role of complexity regulation, the model's comparative statics may prove useful in empirical work. For example, the model suggests a clear set of relationships between policy complexity, bureaucratic capacity, bureaucratic preferences, firm self-regulation, and policy outcomes. These might be tested on cross sections across policy areas, cross sections of the same policy across jurisdictions, or time series within a given policy arena.
generates more information investment by the firm.
An agency with a >ā is also dominated by a =ā. An agency with an ideal point a accepts the unregulated outcome. An agency with a higher ideal point can only move policy further from the principal's ideal, decrease the firm's investment in information, and increase uncertainty about the outcome. So I focus on the case of a 2 [0,ā].
The principal's first-order condition with respect to a is
First, I evaluate the first-order condition at a = 0. At this value, the curly bracketed term is the first-order condition for the optimal x a for an agency with ideal point 0. Therefore, it and the entire first term must equal zero. Now consider the sign of the second term. Since 1 >  1+e ⇤ (0)+✓ 1+e ⇤ (0)
, the regulatory revision case obtains and @x f @a = 0. Therefore, the second term is zero. Because the third term is always positive, the entire first-order condition is positive suggesting that the principal can increase her utility by appointing an agency with a > 0.
In is instructive as to why, the principal may prefer a  0 if the no-revision case obtains at a = 0. As in the revision case, the first term is again zero. Since x f = x a in the norevision case, the second term becomes 2 1+e ⇥ x a1 + x a2 @e @a ⇤ . But because x a2 < 0, the sign of the second term is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 4
If the agency accepts contract {x c , b} it receives b in exchange for accepting the firm's target policy x c . The agency's outside option is to reject the transfer b and set a new target policy based on the firm's target of x c . Therefore, the firm chooses {x c , b} to maximize { (f x c ) 2 ✓ 1+e b} subject to (x . Now the marginal benefit of  is always decreasing so it must be maximized at  =  with a maximal value of 2✓(f a) (1+✓+e) . Therefore, the marginal benefit function is single peaked with a unique maximum at . Since the marginal benefit function is bounded above by (1+e) 3 . When obfuscation is possible, the firm's choice of e a↵ects not only the baseline uncertainty and the equilibrium policy target, but also the level of obfuscation. At low levels of investment, obfuscation is increasing in e as the firm wishes to prevent expropriation.
However, at higher levels of investment obfuscation declines with e because the agency's incentive to revise the firm's target is declining. When this later incentive is strong enough, there will not be an interior solution with e 
